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ABSTRACT
On June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii finally acknowledged
that its decision in Korematsu v. United States (1944) was in error. It took seventyfour years to make that admission, even though it was widely recognized by scholars
and a congressional commission that the decision was fundamentally defective. In
the 1936 Curtiss-Wright decision, the Court completely misinterpreted a speech by
John Marshall when he served in the House of Representatives. Although he referred
to the President as “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations,” he never
argued that the President controlled all of foreign affairs. Such a claim would violate
the plain text of the Constitution. Instead, Marshall defended President John Adams
for acting on the basis of specific authority in the Jay Treaty. Still, the Court spoke
of “very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the president as the sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations.” Scholars immediately
attacked the Court’s error but it remained in place to promote presidential power
until finally jettisoned by the Court in the 2015 Zivotofsky decision. It took seventynine years to correct an obvious and well publicized judicial error.
The 1953 Reynolds case involved a B-29 bomber that exploded over Waycross,
Georgia, killing a number of crewmembers and civilian engineers. Three widows of
the engineers filed a tort claims lawsuit. Lower courts understood the principle of
judicial independence and the need to examine the accident report to determine if the
Air Force had been negligent. The Supreme Court, without looking at the report,
accepted the government’s assertion that it contained state secrets. The plaintiffs later
obtained the declassified report and learned that it contained no state secrets but
abundant evidence of Air Force irresponsibility. They returned to court, charging
fraud against the judiciary. The Supreme Court chose not to take the case. The
erroneous Reynolds decision continues to guide the executive branch and federal
courts, at great cost to individual rights and constitutional government.
An understanding of U.S. history rejects the doctrine of judicial finality, which
asserts that constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court are final unless the Court
changes its mind or the Constitution is amended. That theory is regularly undermined
by historical precedents, demonstrating that constitutional law is shaped by all three
branches and the general public
I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars at times attribute to Chief Justice John Marshall a position he did not
promote. According to Joel Richard Paul in a book published in 2018, Marshall
“elevated the dignity of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of the Constitution’s
meaning.”1 In another study published in 2018, David Kaplan states that Chief
Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison “established that it was the Court that had
the last word on what the Constitution meant” and it “has been accepted wisdom
since.”2 As will be explained, Marshall was well aware that his decision in
1

JOEL RICHARD PAUL, WITHOUT PRECEDENT: JOHN MARSHALL AND HIS TIMES 3 (2018).
DAVID A. KAPLAN, THE MOST DANGEROUS BRANCH: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT’S ASSAULT ON
THE CONSTITUTION 44 (2018).
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McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), upholding the U.S. Bank, did not prevent President
Andrew Jackson on July 19, 1832, from using his own constitutional judgment to
veto a bill designed to renew the bank.3 President Jackson’s veto was not overridden.
This type of constitutional dialogue by all three branches is a fixture of the
American system. Constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court lack finality in part
because human institutions, including the judiciary, are prone to miscalculation and
error. Chief Justice William Rehnquist put the matter bluntly in 1993: “It is an
unalterable fact that our judicial system, like the human beings who administer it, is
fallible.”4 The doctrine of judicial finality has been challenged and thrust aside in
many broad areas: Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation, the Sedition Act of 1798,
the U.S. Bank, the commerce power, individual rights, slavery, freedoms of African
Americans and women, religious liberty, child-labor legislation, the sole-organ
doctrine, the Japanese-American cases, and the state secrets doctrine. In these
constitutional disputes, Supreme Court decisions have often been challenged and
reversed. The system of self-government requires broad and thoughtful deliberation,
not automatic deference to judicial rulings.
Corrections are often needed to take account of changes in public attitudes.
These shifts can generate new constitutional values. Alexander Bickel noted in 1962
that the process of developing constitutional principle in a democratic society “is
evolved conversationally not perfected unilaterally.” 5 On July 20, 1993, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg explained in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee after her
nomination to the Supreme Court: “Justices do not guard constitutional rights alone.
Courts share that profound responsibility with Congress, the president, the states,
and the people.”6
False generalizations about the U.S. government apply to many areas.
Frequently it is said that the President represents the “national interest.” 7 It takes
little effort in reviewing history to understand how often presidential actions have
been flatly against the national interest. In a book published in 2009, Peter Shane
pointed out that “time and time again, it has become evident that Presidents, left
relatively unchecked by dialogue with and accountability to the other two branches,
behave disastrously.”8 Six years later Harold Bruff underscored the same point:
“Even in ordinary times, our system has recently become similar enough to a
permanent constitutional dictatorship to give deep pause.”9 It is a mistake to be
3

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 437 (1819); 3 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
(James D. Richardson, ed., New York: Bureau of National
Literature, 1897-1925).
4 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993).
5 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 244 (1962).
6 RUTH BADER GINSBURG, MY OWN WORDS 183 (2016).
7 WILLIAM G. HOWELL AND TERRY M. MOE, RELIC: HOW OUR CONSTITUTION UNDERMINES
EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT AND WHY WE NEED A MORE POWERFUL PRESIDENCY xvi-xvii (2016).
8 PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 5 (2009).
9 HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION 465
(2015).
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1144
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idealistic about any of the three branches of government.
II. RELYING ON INSTITUTIONAL CHECKS
On May 29, 1789, delegates at the Philadelphia Convention studied a proposal
that the President and “a convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to
compose a council of revision” to examine every federal statute and every act of state
legislatures.10 Elbridge Gerry doubted whether the judiciary should be part of this
council “as they will have a sufficient check against encroachments on their own
department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on
their Constitutionality.”11 Rufus King agreed, observing that judges “ought to be
able to expound the law as it should come before them, free from the bias of having
participated in its formation.”12
As the debate continued, delegates considered a proposal to grant the federal
government a power to “negative all laws passed by the several States contravening
in the opinion of the Nat: Legislature the articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting
under the authority of ye Union.”13 Gouverneur Morris opposed the provision as
“likely to be terrible to the States, and not necessary,” but James Madison considered
a negative on state laws “as essential to the efficacy & security of the Genl. Govt.”
The need for a general government “proceeds from the propensity of the States to
pursue their particular interests in opposition to the general interests.”14 To Morris,
a state law found to be negative “will be set aside in the Judiciary department. And
if that security should fail; may be repealed by a National Law.”15 Efforts to preserve
constitutional government would therefore be a duty of all three branches.
Rejection of the joint council left courts with discretion in cases brought before
them to judge the merits of legislation. To Madison, a law “violating a constitution
established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null &
void.”16 His statements were directed at judicial review at the state, not the national,
level. A year later, writing to Thomas Jefferson, Madison denied that the
Constitution empowered the Supreme Court to strike down acts of Congress, for that
would have made the judiciary “paramount in fact to the Legislature, which was
never intended and can never be proper.”17
The Supreme Court’s website, “The Court and Constitutional Interpretation,”
explains that the Framers “created three independent and coequal branches of
government.”18 The word “coequal” does not imply judicial finality, but the website
10

1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 21 (Max Farrand, ed., 1966) (hereinafter
Farrand).
11 Id. at 97.
12 Id. at 98.
13 2 Farrand 27.
14 Id. at 28.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 93.
17 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 294 (Hunt ed., 1904).
18 The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx [https://perma.cc/284U-QYP6] (last
visited Aug. 16, 2019).
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proceeds to discuss what Alexander Hamilton and James Madison said about judicial
review. According to the website, Madison wanted constitutional government left
to “the reasoned judgment of independent judges, rather than to the tumult and
conflict of the political process.” That implies judicial finality, but when one closely
examines what Hamilton and Madison said, they did not endorse judiciary
supremacy over the other two branches. Certainly the judicial process has had its
share of tumult and conflict.
In this early period, the claim that the Supreme Court announces the last word
on the meaning of the Constitution relies in part on Hamilton’s Federalist 78, which
described judges “as Guardians of the Constitution.” 19 His language appears to
elevate the judiciary to a superior role but the essay proceeds to argue at crosspurposes. It refers to “the natural feebleness of the judiciary” and describes the
judiciary as “beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power.” 20
Hardly evidence of judicial supremacy. Although Hamilton said “the judiciary, from
the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights
of the Constitution,”21 the record from 1789 to the present time demonstrates that all
three branches of the national government have posed dangers to constitutional
rights.
Hamilton argued that “liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary
alone.”22 One might ask: how can the judiciary protect constitutional rights and
liberty if it is “naturally feeble?” Another contradiction in Federalist 78 is the claim
that the Constitution “ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people
to the intention of their agents,” while at the same time denying that this description
supposes “a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power.” 23 In wanting to
recognize in full measure a form of judicial power, Hamilton chose to identify
substantial and natural limits.
In Federalist 81, he analyzed this language in Article III, Section 1: “The judicial
Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” He responded
to arguments that the authority of the proposed Supreme Court “will be superior to
that of the legislature.”24 He noted concern that the power to construe laws could
enable the Court “to mould them into whatever shape it may think proper, especially
as its decisions will not be in any manner subject to the revision or correction of the
legislative body.”25 To Hamilton, that theory of constitutional government “is as
unprecedented as it is dangerous.” Such theories, he said, “will be found to be made
up altogether of false reasoning upon misconceived fact.” 26 A clear rejection of
judicial finality.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE FEDERALIST 489 (2002).
Id. at 491.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 506.
Id.
Id.
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In Federalist 78, Hamilton supports judicial review but did not advocate judicial
supremacy. If judges rendered unsound decisions they would be subject to
impeachment. Moreover, in Federalist 81, Hamilton explains that Congress has
adequate checks to control an overactive Court: “There never can be danger that the
judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature, would
hazard the united resentment of the body intrusted with it, while this body was
possessed of the means of punishing their presumption, by degrading them from their
stations.”27 As to the Court’s role as “guardian” of the Constitution, it is not the only
guardian and at times has failed to safeguard constitutional rights. 28
Madison offered conflicting positions about the scope of judicial power. As
manager of the Bill of Rights in 1789, he predicted that once various provisions were
incorporated into the Constitution, “independent tribunals of justice will consider
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or
Executive.”29 The phrase “peculiar manner” is revealing. Consider how Federalist
judges gave full support to the prosecution of individuals and newspapers for
violating the Sedition Act, to be discussed.
During legislative debate on whether the President possesses power to remove
executive officials, Madison denied that Congress should defer to the courts on that
constitutional issue. He begged to know on what principle it could be contended that
“any one department draws from the Constitution greater power than another, in
marking out the limits of the power of the several departments.” On questions
regarding the boundaries between the branches, he did not see “that any one of these
independent departments has more right than another to declare their sentiments on
that point.”30
III. FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO THOMAS JEFFERSON
Precedents established over the first dozen years help illustrate the competing
roles of all three branches in protecting constitutional government. Consider the
Neutrality Proclamation issued by President Washington on April 22, 1793. It
instructed citizens to remain neutral in the war between England and France. Failure
to do so, he warned, would result in prosecution: “I do hereby also make known that
whosoever of the citizens of the United States shall render himself liable to
punishment or forfeiture under the law of nations by committing, aiding, or abetting
hostilities against any of the said powers . . . .”31 A study by Jean Edward Smith
claims that by issuing the proclamation Washington “had placed a distinctive stamp
on the office” and “had already established the president’s authority to interpret the
Constitution.”32
27

Id. at 509.
See Louis Fisher, One of the Guardians Some of the Time, in ROBERT A. LICHT, ed., IS THE SUPREME
COURT THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION? 82-97 (1993).
29 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
30 Id. at 520.
31 HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 163 (7th ed., 1963).
32 JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 283 (1996).
28
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However, when the issue reached the courts, jurors objected to convicting
someone for a crime established by an executive proclamation. Criminal law in the
United States, they insisted, could be made only by Congress through the regular
legislative process, not by unilateral presidential action. 33 Responding to that
opposition, the administration dropped plans to prosecute. 34 Washington told
lawmakers that it rested with “the wisdom of Congress to correct, improve, or
enforce” the policy set forth in his proclamation, recommending that the legal code
be changed by giving federal courts jurisdiction over issues of neutrality. 35
Congress responded by passing the Neutrality Act of 1794, giving the
administration statutory authority to prosecute violators. 36 On this constitutional
issue, the dispute was not resolved by seeking from courts the final word. Jurors had
a better understanding of the Constitution than Washington and his circle of legal
advisers. The system of checks and balances depended not on the three branches but
on private citizens willing to uphold self-government and constitutional principles.
Similarly, the constitutionality of the Sedition Act of 1798 was not analyzed and
struck down in the courts. Thomas Jefferson hoped that courts would intercede and
declare the legislation unconstitutional: “The laws of the land, administered by
upright judges, would protect you from any exercise of power unauthorized by the
Constitution of the United States.”37 Some members of Congress regarded the
legislation as a blatant violation of press freedoms protected by the First Amendment.
To Representative Nathanial Macon, Congress lacked constitutional authority to pass
the legislation and “could only hope that the Judges would exercise the power placed
in them of determining the law as unconstitutional . . . .”38 There would be no judicial
check.
In a book published in 2016, Terri Diane Halperin points out that the Sedition
Act “infringed upon the rights of speech, but, as many opponents argued, the law
also posed a threat to other rights listed in the First Amendment, including freedom
of the press and the right to petition the government for ‘a redress of grievances.’”39
In the national elections of 1800, Democratic-Republicans triumphed over the
Federalists. The Sedition Act was a significant factor in that result. 40 It has been
said that the Sedition Act “was in effect declaring war upon the ideas of the French
Revolution.”41 It was also a declaration of war against constitutional rights. The
federal judiciary supported prosecutions under the Sedition Act “with such ardor as
33

See HENFIELD’S CASE, 11 Fed. Cas. 1099 (C.C. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360); see also FRANCIS WHARTON,
STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS
84-85, 88 (1849).
34 ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 110
(1976).
35 3 ANNALS OF CONG., 11 (1793) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
36
1 Stat. 369-70 (1794).
37 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Memorial ed., 1903-04).
38 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2152 (1798) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
39 TERRI DIANE HALPERIN, THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS OF 1798: TESTING THE CONSTITUTION 7
(2016).
40 Id. at 120.
41 JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 74 (1951).
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to raise grave doubts concerning its ability to conduct an impartial trial.”42 Federalist
judges defined “patriotism by their own narrow partisan standards and interpreted
seditious libel in such a way as to preclude ordinary political activity.” 43 Far from
performing as an independent branch determined to protect constitutional principles,
these judges chose to promote and defend partisan objectives.
Federal judges were unlikely to strike down a statute passed by a Federalist
administration to silence domestic opponents of the executive branch. They
regularly upheld prosecutions against Republican newspapers and even a member of
Congress, Representative Matthew Lyon.44 The constitutionality of the Sedition Act
was decided not by the courts but by the elections of 1800, which drove Federalists
out of office and ushered in President Jefferson and the Republican Party.
One of Jefferson’s first actions as President was to call the Sedition Act
unconstitutional and pardon all individuals punished or prosecuted under it.45 He
considered the legislation “to be a nullity, as absolute and as palpable as if Congress
had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image.”46 He denied that the
judiciary possessed a monopoly in deciding constitutional issues. To allow judges
to decide what laws are constitutional, not only in their own “sphere of action” but
legislative and executive spheres as well, “would make the judiciary a despotic
branch.”47
Congress passed private bills to reimburse individuals who had been fined under
the Sedition Act. In 1840, it appropriated $1,060.96, with interest from February 9,
1799, to the heirs of Matthew Lyon. 48 The House Judiciary Committee explained
that those funds were provided because the Sedition Act was “unconstitutional, null,
void, passed under a mistaken exercise of undelegated power, and the mistake ought
to be corrected by returning the fine so obtained, with interest thereon.” 49 In 1964,
the Supreme Court acknowledged that “although the Sedition Act was never tested
in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history.” 50
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF JOHN MARSHALL
Scholars often attribute to John Marshall a position he did not hold or promote.
A study by Joel Richard Paul in 2018 claimed that Marshall “elevated the dignity of
the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of the Constitution’s meaning.” 51 Similarly,
Ronald Rotunda stated that Marshall “created judicial review in Marbury v.
42

Id. at 136.
Id.
44
See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 48-68 (2004).
45 11 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 43 (Bergh. ed 1905). This was a letter to Mrs. John Adams,
July 22, 1804.
46 Id. at 43-44.
47 Id. at 51.
48 AN ACT TO REFUND A FINE IMPOSED ON THE LATE MATTHEW LYON, UNDER THE SEDITION LAW, TO
HIS LEGAL HEIRS AND REPRESENTATIVES, ch. 45 (1840).
49 U.S. CONGRESS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, “MATTHEW LYON-HEIRS OF,” H. Rept. No.
86, 26th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2 (1840).
50 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
51 JOEL RICHARD PAUL, WITHOUT PRECEDENT: JOHN MARSHALL AND HIS TIMES 3 (2018).
43
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Madison.”52 However, judicial review had been established before Marshall joined
the Court as Chief Justice. In a study published in 2005, William Michael Treanor
identified thirty-one cases before Marbury where American courts invalidated a
statute.53
Throughout the 1790s, federal courts began to review and invalidate a number
of state laws.54 In 1792, federal judges objected to a congressional statute enacted
that year requiring them to serve as commissioners on claims settlement. 55 Because
their decisions could be set aside by the Secretary of War, they were essentially
issuing “advisory opinions” and serving in a subordinate capacity to executive
officials. Before the Supreme Court could rule on the statute’s constitutionality,
Congress repealed the offending sections and removed the Secretary’s authority to
veto decisions rendered by federal judges.56
In 1796, the Supreme Court upheld a congressional statute that imposed a tax
on carriages. If the Court was empowered to uphold federal legislation, it possessed
authority to strike one down if defects were found. In this case, Justice Samuel Chase
said it was unnecessary “at this time, for me to determine, whether this court,
constitutionally possesses the power to declare an act of Congress void . . . but if the
court have such power, I am free to declare, that I will never exercise it, but in a very
clear case.”57 Two years later, the Court upheld another congressional statute, this
time allowing constitutional amendments to go directly to the states for ratification
rather than first submitting them to the President.58
Marbury v. Madison (1803) is often described as a decision by which Chief
Justice Marshall declared that the Court has ultimate authority on constitutional
questions. In fact, the decision is much more modest in scope. The issue was
whether William Marbury and those who joined in the lawsuit had the right to their
position as justices of the peace. They had been nominated for that post and the
Senate confirmed their selections. But in the hectic remaining weeks of the John
Adams administration, their commissions were not delivered to them. The person
who failed to do that was John Marshall, Secretary of State at the time. Given his
personal role in the dispute, how could Marshall as Chief Justice not only participate
in the case but also write for the Court? Why not recuse himself? In a case discussed
next, Stuart v. Laird, Marshall recused himself “in light of his prior involvement.” 59
As the decision notes: “The chief justice, having tried the cause in the court below,
declined giving an opinion.”60
52

RONALD D. ROTUNDA, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CASES THAT UNITED THE STATES OF AMERICA:
BEVERIDGE’S ABRIDGED LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 175 (2018).
53 William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 457-58 (2005).
54 See CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 65-69 (Little, Brown,
and Co. rev. 1st ed. 1937).
55 1 Stat. 143-45 (March 23, 1792).
56 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409-10 (1792); Act of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 324-25.
57 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) (emphasis in original).
58 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 382 (1798).
59 CLIFF SLOAN AND DAVID MCKEAN, THE GREAT DECISION: JEFFERSON, ADAMS, MARSHALL, AND
THE BATTLE FOR THE SUPREME COURT 169 (2009).
60 Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 308 (1803).
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Marbury and three co-plaintiffs were represented by Charles Lee. How could
they come directly to the Supreme Court instead of beginning in district court?
During oral argument, Lee explored the Court’s authority to issue a writ commanding
a specific act or duty. The question was basic: “Whether the supreme court can
award the writ of mandamus in any case?”61 For support he turned to language in
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789:
[T]he supreme court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts,
and courts of the several states, in the cases hereinafter specially provided for; and
shall have power to issue writs of prohibition in the district courts, when proceeding
as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and writs of mandamus, in cases
warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons
holding office, under the authority of the United States.62

As explained by Edward Corwin, Marshall reversed the “usual order of
procedure,” choosing to leave the question of jurisdiction “till the very last, and so
created for himself an opportunity to lecture the President [Jefferson] on his duty to
obey the law and to deliver the commission.” 63 What the Court should have done,
Corwin said, “was to dismiss the case as not falling within the contemplation of
section thirteen, and not on the ground of the unconstitutionality of that section.” 64
In Marbury, Marshall stated it is “emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”65 Nothing in that sentence says anything
about judicial finality. It merely states that courts decide cases, which we know. It
is also emphatically the province and duty of the executive and legislative branches
to say what the law is. Surely Marshall did not think he was powerful enough in
1803 to order President Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison to deliver
commissions to Marbury and the other plaintiffs. Marshall understood that Jefferson
and Madison would ignore any order from the Supreme Court to deliver the
commissions. As Chief Justice Warren Burger noted in 1985: “The Court could
stand hard blows, but not ridicule, and the ale houses would rock with hilarious
laughter” had Marshall issued a mandamus that the Jefferson administration
ignored.66
Marshall ruled Section 13 to be unconstitutional, the first instance of the
Supreme Court striking down legislation passed by Congress. That result was not
required. Marshall could have told Marbury and his colleagues: “You must start in
district court. Section 13 provides you with no authority to bring this issue directly
to the Supreme Court.” Instead of striking down statutory language, it would have
been sufficient for Marshall to simply reject Lee’s strained interpretation. Marshall
chose to act more in a political than a judicial manner. Many studies explore the
61

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 146 (1803).
Id. at 148 (emphasis added in oral argument); 1 Stat. 73, 80-81, sec. 13 (1789). There are minor but
inconsequential differences between the language offered by Lee and the statutory language.
63 EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION 65 (1919).
64 Id. at 66.
65 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
66 Warren E. Burger, The Doctrine of Judicial Review: Mr. Marshall, Mr. Jefferson, and Mr. Marbury,
in VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 14 (Mark Cannon and David O’Brien, eds., 1985).
62
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manner in which he decided Marbury.67
In a case decided one week after Marbury, the Court reviewed the action of the
Jeffersonian Congress to repeal legislation passed in the waning days of Federalist
control under President John Adams. The statute created sixteen new judgeships.
They were quickly nominated and confirmed by the Senate. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist has noted, the appointees were “dubbed by the Republicans the ‘Midnight
Judges’ because of the belief that Adams had stayed up until midnight making the
appointments in the waning hours of his presidency.” 68
Did Jeffersonians have authority to abolish courts with Article III judges entitled
to lifetime terms? Would the Supreme Court invoke the power of judicial review
and invalidate the repeal law? Such action would greatly intensify congressional
efforts under President Jefferson to impeach and remove Federalist judges, including
those on the Supreme Court. Facing the risk of confrontation with Congress, the
Court held that the issue of circuit judges had been settled by congressional action in
1789 when it created circuit courts and required Supreme Court Justices to “ride
circuit.” In short, the Court deferred to the constitutional judgment of Congress. As
the Court noted, practice from 1789 forward, “commencing with the organization of
the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the
construction” of the Constitution. This “practical exposition is too strong and
obstinate to be shaken or controlled.”69 On this constitutional issue the elected
branches delivered the final word.
The record is clear during this period that Marshall did not believe the Court was
supreme on legal or constitutional questions. His behavior during the impeachment
hearings of Judge John Pickering and Justice Samuel Chase suggests he was quite
willing to share that responsibility with Congress and the President. Marbury was
decided on February 24, 1803. The House impeached Pickering on March 2, 1803
and the Senate convicted him on March 12, 1804. As soon as the House impeached
Pickering, it turned its guns on Chase. Had Chase been impeached and removed,
Marshall understood he was likely the next target.
In this context, Marshall wrote to Chase on January 23, 1805, suggesting that
members of Congress did not have to impeach judges whenever they disagreed with
their legal opinions. Instead, Congress could simply review and reverse
objectionable decisions through the regular legislative process. The Court could say
“what the law is” but so could Congress. Marshall’s letter is somewhat ambiguous.
He could have been referring to congressional reversals of statutory interpretation by
the courts, not constitutional interpretation. But Marshall did not make that
distinction. Given the temper of the times, Marshall most likely meant constitutional
as well as statutory interpretation.
67
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Consider his language to Chase:
I think the modern doctrine of impeachment should yield to an appellate jurisdiction
in the legislature. A reversal of those legal opinions deemed unsound by the
legislature would certainly better comport with the mildness of our character than
[would] a removal of the Judge who has rendered them unknowing of his fault. 70

Nothing in that language smacks of judicial superiority or finality. It is
significant that following his decision in Marbury, Marshall never struck down
another congressional statute. Over the following decades, he consistently upheld
the power of Congress to exercise the commerce clause, create a U.S. Bank, and
discharge other constitutional responsibilities, whether express or implied. With
regard to this exercise of congressional power, the Marshall Court functioned as a
yea-saying, not a negative, branch.
In Cohens v. Virginia (1821), Marshall berated those who rummaged around
Marbury looking for “some dicta” to support their cause. The “single question”
before the Court, he emphasized, was “whether the legislature could give this Court
original jurisdiction in a case in which the constitution had clearly not given it . . .
.”71 That was the core holding. Everything else, including possible claims of judicial
supremacy and finality, amounts to dicta.
In their chapter “The Meaning of Marbury,” Cliff Sloan and David McKean
interpret the decision to assert not merely “the principle of an independent judiciary”
but a system that makes the Supreme Court “the ultimate authority on
constitutionality.”72 Even if there is disagreement at times about Supreme Court
decisions, “everybody respects a system in which the Supreme Court fairly resolves
these contested constitutional issues.”73 They describe the Court not as “a co-equal
branch” but one “that can and does have the last word on the Constitution.” 74 The
record does not support the claim of judicial supremacy.
During Marshall’s own lifetime, he was well aware that his constitutional
decisions could be, and actually were, reversed by the other branches. The history
of the U.S. Bank illustrates that point. In McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), the
Supreme Court decided two issues: whether Congress possessed an implied power
to create a national bank and whether the State of Maryland could tax the bank.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Marshall in his initial paragraph promoted the notion
of judicial finality. Of the various questions presented to the Court, he said if the
case had to be decided, “by this tribunal alone can the decision be made.” On the
Supreme Court, “has the constitution of our country devolved this important duty.”75
Marshall turned his attention to language in the Constitution stating that
Congress shall make all laws which shall be “necessary and proper” for carrying into
70
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effect the powers expressly stated. Under that analysis, he concluded that the act to
create the Bank of the United States “is a law made in pursuance of the constitution,
and is a part of the supreme law of the land.”76 He also decided that Maryland had
no authority to tax the Bank. 77 The fact that the Court upheld the Bank did not
prevent Congress or the President reaching different conclusions at a later date. If
Congress decided that the operation of the Bank created unacceptable results, it could
decide not to renew it.
Moreover, if Congress decided at a later date to support the bank, the President
could exercise independent judgment and veto the bill. That is what happened on
July 10, 1832, when President Andrew Jackson vetoed a bill to incorporate the bank.
He admitted that a bank of the United States “is in many respects convenient for the
Government and useful to the people.”78 However, various features of the bill
convinced him to exercise a veto. He noted that advocates of the bank maintained
that “its constitutionality in all its features ought to be considered as settled by
precedent and by the decision of the Supreme Court.” 79 With that conclusion he did
not agree: “Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be
regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power except where the
acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as well settled.”80 He
reviewed the legislative history of the bank: Congress favoring it in 1791, voting
against it in 1811 and 1815, but in favor again in 1816.81
As to the Court’s decision in McCulloch, Jackson in a single paragraph set forth
his main principles. Even if the decision “covered the whole ground of this act, it
ought not to control the coordinate authorities of this government.” Congress, the
President, and the Supreme Court “must each for itself be guided by its own opinion
of the Constitution.” Each public officer who takes an oath to support the
Constitution “swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is
understood by others.” The opinion of judges “has no more authority over Congress
than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is
independent of both.”82
Jackson interpreted McCulloch to mean that:
[I]t is the exclusive province of Congress and the President to decide whether the
particular features of this act are necessary and proper in order to enable the bank
to perform conveniently and efficiently the public duties assigned to it as a fiscal
agent, and therefore constitutional, or unnecessary and improper, and therefore
unconstitutional.83

Congress did not override his veto. Aware of Jackson’s action, Marshall had full
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appreciation of the degree to which the elected branches could reverse constitutional
decisions by the Supreme Court. Marshall passed away on July 6, 1835.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES ON COMMERCE POWER
Supreme Court Justices continue to cite Marbury in an effort to shore up their
decisions. In Cooper v. Aaron, the Court claimed that Marbury “declared the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the
Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”84
The historical record flatly rejects that understanding of Marbury.
Consider litigation over a bridge that Virginia built over the Ohio River. On
August 16, 1849, in a federal appellate court in Philadelphia, Justice Robert C. Grier
received an injunction from the Attorney General of Pennsylvania directed against
the Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company. 85 The complaint stated that the bridge
“will hinder and prevent the passage of citizens along said river under such bridge.” 86
To provide assistance in analyzing this issue of the commerce power, a commissioner
was appointed. He directed an engineer to take measurements of the bridge and
report back his findings. 87
After receiving the height of the bridge, the water level, and the height of
chimneys of approaching boats, the commissioner concluded that the bridge
represented an obstruction over a navigable stream. 88 Accepting the commissioner’s
judgment, the Supreme Court held that “said suspension-bridge is an obstruction and
nuisance” and that the state of Pennsylvania “has a just and legal right to have the
navigation of the said river made free.”89 The Court released its decision on February
6, 1852, and in amended form in May. Did its position on this constitutional issue
amount to judicial finality? Not at all. It merely represented a single chapter in
judicial-congressional relations, with more to come.
On August 12, 1852, the House of Representatives began debate on a bill to
make the Wheeling Bridge “a lawful structure.”90 In sponsoring this legislation, Rep.
Joseph Addison Woodward insisted that the “ultimate right” to decide the issue was
in Congress pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce and preserve
intercourse among the states.91 On the issue of the bridge obstructing commerce,
why was the Supreme Court the better judge? The fact-finding capacity of the
legislative branch was certainly equal to if not superior to the judiciary. The Court
had shifted the investigation to a commissioner. Why should his judgment control
Congress? Senator George W. Badger denied that Congress was seeking “some
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revising power over the adjudications of the Supreme Court.” 92 Instead, Congress
was exercising “our legislative functions, as the court discharged its judicial
functions.”93 He pointed out that boats should not be allowed to deliberately
construct artificially high chimneys that could not clear the Wheeling Bridge. On
that issue, the legislative branch proved to be more informed, perceptive, and
insightful than the judiciary. Rather than altering the bridge to accommodate vessels,
ships should adjust their height to the bridge. The Supreme Court and its
commissioner did not consider that elementary issue.
Legislative language enacted on August 31, 1852, stated that bridges across the
Ohio River “are hereby declared to be lawful structures in their present position and
elevation.”94 The statute required vessels navigating the Ohio River to ensure that
any pipes or chimneys shall not “interfere with the elevation and construction of said
bridges.”95 When the dispute returned to the Supreme Court, Pennsylvania insisted
that the statute was “unconstitutional and void.” 96 Writing for the majority, Justice
Samuel Nelson explained that when the Court acted in 1852 it did so without
guidance from Congress. It now had clear statutory direction.
Nelson wrote “it is urged, that the act of Congress cannot have the effect and
operation to annul the judgment of the court already rendered, or the rights
determined thereby in favor of the plaintiff.”97 Yet he concluded that the legislation
passed by Congress “is not inconsistent with the clause of the constitution referred
to.”98 After Congress passed that legislation, Nelson noted that the bridge had
collapsed in a gale of wind and Pennsylvania had taken legal steps to prevent the
company from reconstructing the bridge. The company ignored that effort and
proceeded to rebuild the bridge. To the Court, the congressional statute “afforded
full authority to the defendants to reconstruct the bridge.” 99 The four dissenting
Justices each wrote separately to express dismay with the majority’s holding that a
decision by the Supreme Court on a constitutional question could be reversed by
Congress.100
Another judicial-congressional dialogue on constitutional matters concerning
the commerce power occurred in 1890 when the Supreme Court in Leisy v. Hardin
ruled that Iowa’s prohibition on intoxicating liquors from outside its borders could
not be applied to original packages or kegs. 101 Justices Gray, Harlan, and Brewer
filed a thirty-five page dissent, insisting that states had available to them the “police
power” to protect inhabitants “against disorder, disease, poverty, and crime.” 102
The Court issued its opinion on April 28, 1890. Less than a month later, on May
92
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14, the Senate reported a bill granting states authority to regulate incoming
intoxicating liquors.103 As congressional debate proceeded, lawmakers offered
irreverent remarks about the Court’s capacity to understand constitutional issues.
Senator George Edmunds described the Court as “an independent and co-ordinate
branch of the Government” empowered to decide cases, but “as it regards the
Congress of the United States, its opinions are of no more value to us than ours are
to it. We are just as independent of the Supreme Court of the United States as it is
of us, and every judge will admit it.” 104
Congress enacted remedial legislation on August 6, 1890, slightly more than
three months after the Court’s decision. 105 The statute made intoxicating liquors,
upon their arrival in a state or territory, subject to the police power of a state “to the
same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been
produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of
being introduced in original packages or otherwise.” 106 When the constitutionality
of this statute returned to the Supreme Court a year later, it was upheld
unanimously.107
In subsequent years, the Supreme Court has spoken clearly about this
constitutional dialogue between Congress and the states concerning the commerce
power. A 1946 decision acknowledged that in conflicts between Congress and the
Supreme Court over the commerce clause, the Court has accepted the judgment of
Congress.108 In 1985, the Court wrote that “[w]hen Congress so chooses, state
actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the
Commerce Clause.”109 In a concurrence in 1995, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor
conceded that judicial finality does not exist in this type of constitutional dispute,
noting that “if we invalidate a state law, Congress can in effect overturn our
judgment.”110
VI. PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
It is frequently argued that the Supreme Court is especially qualified in
protecting individual rights. During his service as governor of New York, Charles
Evans Hughes spoke strongly in defense of Supreme Court finality. In a speech on
May 3, 1907, he rebuked those as “the worst enemies of the community who will
talk lightly of the dignity of the bench,” stating that “[w]e are under a Constitution,
but the Constitution is what judges say it is.” The judiciary is “the safeguard of our
liberty and of our property under the Constitution.” 111
103
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Yet when Hughes many decades later spoke about judicial power, he recognized
that the Supreme Court “has the inevitable failings of any human institution.” 112 He
said that in “three noticeable instances” the Court “suffered severely from selfinflicted wounds” by deciding Dred Scott, the Legal Tender Cases, and the Income
Tax Cases.113 With regard to Dred Scott, the Supreme Court faced two principal
issues: whether a black man could sue in federal court and whether Congress had
authority to prohibit slavery in the western territories. James Buchanan, newly
elected President, decided not to provide any leadership or guidance on those issues.
He chose to defer entirely to the Supreme Court. To him, the constitutional issue of
slavery presented
a judicial question, which legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court of the United
States, before whom it is now pending, and will, it is understood, be speedily and
finally settled. To their decision, in common with all good citizens, I shall cheerfully
submit, whatever this may be . . . .114

Buchanan was correct that Supreme Court action on the Dred Scott case would
be speedy. The decision was released two days later. Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Roger Taney decided that “a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this
country, and sold as slaves,” had no right to sue in a federal court in cases specified
by the Constitution.115 On the issue of whether Congress possessed constitutional
authority to prohibit slavery in the territories, Taney concluded that Congress had no
authority to prohibit a citizen from holding and owning slaves north of the dividing
line in the western territories.116 Throughout his opinion, Taney relied heavily on
British precedents regarding slavery, suggesting that those principles were well
established and fixed. He made no mention that England in 1833 had prohibited
slavery.
Taney’s fifty-five page opinion for the Court has been praised by some scholars
for imparting unity to the Court. In a study published in 2006, Austin Allen states
that the decision brought “judicial harmony” and settled “the internal divisions that
had plagued the justices.” Dred Scott “resolved the issues that had so bitterly divided
the justices between the 1852 and 1855 terms.” 117 Yet Taney’s decision prompted
six separate concurrences by Justices James Wayne, Samuel Nelson, Robert Grier,
Peter Daniel, John Campbell, and John Catron (totaling seventy-six pages). Justices
John McLean and Benjamin Curtis wrote separate dissenting opinions, covering 105
pages.
In his inaugural address in 1861, Abraham Lincoln said he did “not forget the
position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to be decided by the
Supreme Court.” Nor did he deny “that such decisions must be binding in any case
112
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upon the parties to a suit as to the object of that suit” while also being “entitled to
very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of
the Government.”118 Having addressed Dred Scott obliquely in that manner, Lincoln
came directly to the doctrine of judicial finality, stating
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital
questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the
Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in
personal actions the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that
extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent
tribunal.119

In legislation enacted in 1862, Congress asserted its independent constitutional
authority by prohibiting slavery in the territories. 120 What the Supreme Court in
Dred Scott said that Congress could not do, it did. Also in 1862, Attorney General
Edward Bates released an opinion to the Secretary of the Treasury concerning the
issue of “whether or not colored men can be citizens of the United States.”121 If so,
are they “therefore competent to command American vessels?”122 He offered the
following judgment:
In the United States it is too late now to deny the political rights and obligations
conferred and imposed by nativity; for our laws do not pretend to create or enact
them, but do assume and recognize them as things known to all men, because preexistent and natural; and therefore things of which the laws must take cognizance.123

Contrary to the principles announced in Dred Scott, Bates concluded:
I give it as my opinion that the free man of color, mentioned in your letter, if born
in the United States, is a citizen of the United States; and, if otherwise qualified, is
competent, according to the acts of Congress, to be master of a vessel engaged in
the coasting trade.124

In 1875, members of Congress passed legislation to further implement the Civil
War Amendments. The preamble of the statute began: “Whereas, it is essential to
just government we recognize the equality of all men before the law . . . .”125
Although the Civil War Amendments officially elevated blacks to the status of
citizen, in some states they were denied access to public facilities. Under the 1875
legislation, all persons in the United States were entitled to the “full and equal
enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns,
public conveyances [transportation] on land and water, and other places of public
118
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amusement.”126
During House debate, Benjamin Butler of Massachusetts explained how
Congress could protect constitutional rights violated by the states. As chairman of
the Judiciary Committee and Republican floor leader, he explained it was not the
intent of Congress to bring “social equality” among blacks and whites. Instead, the
legislative purpose was to underscore a fundamental legal principle:
The colored men are either American citizens or they are not. The Constitution, for
good or evil, for right or wrong, has made them American citizens; and the moment
they were clothed with that attribute of citizenship, they stood on a political and
legal equality with every other citizen, be he whom he may. 127

Butler explained that the legislative purpose was not social equality. 128
Individuals had full freedom to pick their friends and associates, but those choices
had nothing to do with the right of access to public facilities. From Butler’s own
experience, the men and women riding in the cars “[were] not [his] associates.”129
He preferred not to sit next to many white men and white women, but they had a
legal right to ride in the cars. The same principle applied to attending a theater, inn,
or tavern. Butler felt no obligation to speak to anyone at a public accommodation.
As he explained, the bill did not force whites to associate with blacks or vice versa.130
After the bill passed the House 161 to 79 and the Senate 38 to 26, President Grant
signed it into law.131
The statute, after challenges in five states (California, Kansas, Missouri, New
York, and Tennessee), did not reach the Supreme Court until 1882. A year later, the
Court declared the public accommodations statute an encroachment on the states and
an interference with private relationships. The Court insisted that Congress, under
the Fourteenth Amendment, could regulate only “state action,” not discrimination by
private parties, stating that “[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject-matter of the amendment.”132 The statute had nothing to do with
discrimination by private parties. It focused exclusively on state policy requiring
access to public accommodations.
In his dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan explained why the statute did not
invade state or individual rights. The public accommodations at issue were activities
that had been promoted, subsidized, and licensed by the state. Even if controlled and
owned by private corporations, railroads were able to extend their operations only
after the state seized land through the power of eminent domain. 133 Places of public
amusement did not receive state assistance, as with railroads, but they were
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established and licensed under the law. 134 Authority to create and maintain them
comes from the public. “A license from the public . . . imports, in law, equality of
right, at such places, among all the members of the public.” 135
In the 1960s, Congress once again passed legislation providing for equal access
to public accommodations. The bill attracted strong bipartisan support. Private
groups lobbied for the bill, creating a political base that helped educate citizens and
build public support. The rights of blacks were supported far better through this
political process than through judicial action. In two unanimous opinions, the
Supreme Court relied on the commerce power to uphold the public accommodations
title.136 What could have been accomplished in 1875 had to wait nearly a century
because of judicial obstruction.
Decisions by the Supreme Court after the Civil War repeatedly underscore its
failure to uphold individual rights. As with blacks, women learned that their interests
were better protected by legislative bodies, at both the state and national level. A
good example is the experience of Myra Bradwell. After studying law, she applied
for admission to the Illinois bar in 1869.137 To take that step, she needed the approval
of a panel of all-male judges to practice law in the state. They denied her application
solely on the grounds that she was a woman.138 The Supreme Court of Illinois
rejected her appeal.139 Of her qualifications, the court said, “we have no doubt,” 140
but British law and custom weighed heavily on the court’s analysis. Female
attorneys “were unknown in England” and the suggestion that a woman could enter
the courts as a barrister would have created “hardly less astonishment” than if she
were placed on the bench of bishops or was elected to the House of Commons. 141
The Illinois court did not limit its analysis to the U.S. Constitution and British
precedents. It also found guidance from higher authority: “That God designed the
sexes to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to make,
apply and execute the laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic truth.” 142
Axiomatic. Additional thinking or analysis was not required. Of further interest, the
court advised that if change was needed to recognize greater rights for women, “let
it be made by that department of the government to which the constitution has
entrusted the power of changing the laws.” 143 The state legislature could decide if
allowing women to “engage in the hot strifes of the bar, in the presence of the public,
and with momentous verdicts the prizes of the struggle, would not tend to destroy
134
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the deference and delicacy with which it is the pride of our ruder sex to treat her . . .
.”144 In so many words: if the legislature wanted to corrupt and damage women, go
ahead.
After this experience with the Illinois court, Bradwell followed its advice and
sought help from the state legislature. 145 It passed a bill in 1872 stating that “no
person shall be precluded or debarred from any occupation, profession or
employment (except military) on account of sex.” 146 The statute included some
qualifications. Nothing in it was to be “construed as requiring any female to work on
streets or roads, or serve on juries.”147 Bradwell and other women now had the right
to practice law within the state.
Bradwell decided to take the issue to the U.S. Supreme Court to establish a
national right of women to practice law. She had the legal assistance of Matthew H.
Carpenter.148 In a brief opinion, the Court examined the claim that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment included the right of women
to serve as attorneys. The Court agreed that certain privileges and immunities belong
to citizens of the United States, “[b]ut the right to admission to practice in the courts
of a State is not one of them.”149 A concurrence by Justice Joseph P. Bradley offered
additional reasons why women should not be permitted to practice law. He insisted
that the civil law, “as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference
in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.” 150 He insisted that man
“is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender.” 151 The “natural and proper
timidity and delicacy” of women made them “unfit” for many occupations, including
law.152 Reaching to a higher plane, he argued that a “divine ordinance” commanded
that a woman’s primary mission in life is centered in the home. 153 While some
women do not marry, he nonetheless decided that a general rule imposed upon
women the “paramount destiny and mission” to fulfill the roles of wife and
mother.154 For Bradley: “This is the law of the Creator.”155 Years later, conditions
changed for Myra Bradwell. In 1892, on the motion of U.S. Attorney General
William Henry Harrison Miller, the Supreme Court admitted her to practice before
it.156
During this period, Belva Lockwood was also successful in turning to
lawmakers to expand the right of women to practice law. In the 1870s, the Supreme
Court adopted a rule denying women the right to practice before it. Admitted to the
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District of Columbia bar in 1873, she drafted legislation in 1876 to overturn that rule.
Her bill provided than any woman admitted to the bar of the highest court of a state,
or of the D.C. Supreme Court, and otherwise qualified as set forth in the bill (three
years of practice and a person of good moral character, as with male attorneys), may
be admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court. She took her draft to
members of Congress to seek their support.
Would the all-male legislative body of Congress conclude, as did the courts, that
the “natural delicacy” of women made them unfit for law? Her bill became law
within one year, underscoring the striking difference between lawmakers and judges
on how they interpreted constitutional rights. The bill reached the House floor on
February 21, 1878, and passed 169 to 87. Benjamin Butler, chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, said the committee unanimously supported the bill.157 On March 18, the
Senate Judiciary Committee voted against the bill, reasoning that ever since the
founding of the national government the Supreme Court and every other federal court
had declined to admit women to practice law. Instead of acting and thinking
independently, the committee chose to defer to judicial precedents. 158
Senator Aaron Sargent of California pushed hard for passage. Under his
pressure, the committee promised to report the bill for floor deliberation.159 With
the committee continuing to oppose the bill, Sargent reviewed progress that women
had made in various professions, including medicine and surgery. He argued that in
America no man “has a right to put a limit to the exertions or the sphere of woman.
That is a right which only can be possessed by that sex itself.” The “enjoyment of
liberty, the pursuit of happiness in her own way, is as much the birthright of woman
as of man.”160 The bill now passed the Senate 39 to 20. The statute provided that
any woman who had been a member of the bar of the highest court of any state or
territory, or of the D.C. Supreme Court, for at least three years, had maintained a
good standing before such court, and was a person of good moral character, “shall,
on motion, and the production of such record, be admitted to practice before the
Supreme Court of the United States.” 161
Not until 1971 did the Supreme Court issue an opinion striking down sex
discrimination. A unanimous Court declared invalid an Idaho law that preferred men
over women in administering estates.162 A study by John Johnson and Charles
Knapp that year denounced the failure of courts to defend the rights of women. They
concluded that “by and large the performance of American judges in the area of sex
discrimination can be succinctly described as ranging from poor to abominable.” 163
Advances in women’s rights continue to come from the elected branches, not
the courts. Consider the case of Lilly Ledbetter. In 2007, the Supreme Court split
157
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5-4 in deciding that she had filed an untimely claim against Goodyear Tire for pay
discrimination. She had worked there from 1979 to 1998. For most of that time, she
was unaware that she was paid less than men doing the same work. Writing for the
majority, Justice Alito claimed that anyone filing a charge of unequal pay to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had to file within a specified period,
either 180 or 300 days (depending on the state) after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred. The shorter period, he said, applied to Ledbetter.164
According to Alito, she should have filed within 180 days “after each allegedly
discriminatory pay decision was made and communicated to her.” 165
However, Goodyear never communicated to Ledbetter discriminatory pay
decisions. Only years later did she discover she had been paid less than men for
performing the same work. In a dissent joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer, Justice Ginsburg noted the disparity between Ledbetter’s monthly salary as
area manager and those of her male counterparts for the end of 1997. The latter
group ranged from a high of $5,236 to a low of $4,286. Her monthly salary for that
time period was $3,727. Recalling the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that overturned in
whole or in part nine decisions of the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg remarked:
“Once again, the ball is in Congress’s court. As in 1991, the Legislature may act to
correct this Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.”166
In late July 2007, the House of Representatives debated the Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act to reverse the Court’s decision. Voting 225 to 199, the House passed the
bill.167 The legislation, amending Title VII and several other statutes, clarified that
a discriminatory pay action can occur each time a worker is paid. With that
understanding, a company could not discriminate, withhold that information from
the employee, and be at liberty to continue discriminatory pay actions in the future
without fear of litigation.
Senate action was delayed until early 2009, when it voted 61 to 36 to support
the legislation.168 Voting 250 to 177, the House agreed with the Senate bill. 169 As
enacted, the bill provides that an unlawful employment practice occurs when a
discriminatory compensation decision is adopted. Nothing in the statute limits an
employee’s right to challenge an unlawful employment practice. 170 Discriminatory
actions carry forth in each paycheck, allowing women to file a complaint in a timely
manner for relief.
VII. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
We are generally taught that courts, not the elected branches, are best suited to
protect individual rights. Legislative bodies, operating by majority vote, are
supposedly insensitive and unresponsive to minority interests, including those of
164
165
166
167
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religious beliefs. However, on a regular basis individuals and religious groups found
support not from the judiciary but from the legislative and executive branches. It
might seem logical that a majoritarian institution like Congress cannot be trusted to
protect minorities, but history does not follow logic. At the Philadelphia Convention,
John Dickinson offered valuable advice: “Experience must be our only guide.
Reason may mislead us.”171
James Madison predicted that by adding a Bill of Rights to the Constitution,
“independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights.”172 His forecast fell quite short unless we want to speculate
on what he meant by “peculiar manner.” For the first century and a half, individual
rights were promoted and protected almost exclusively through the majoritarian
process. The Supreme Court did little to define the jurisprudence of religious
freedom until 1940.173 That case involved a Jehovah’s Witness who went house to
house to solicit money, sell books, and play records on a portable phonograph. 174
Some of the records included attacks on Roman Catholics. A unanimous Court
struck down a state law that prohibited any person from soliciting money for an
alleged religious cause without approval from a designated official.175
Two weeks later, the Supreme Court decided another case involving Jehovah’s
Witnesses, this time ruling against them. 176 By a vote of 8 to 1, it upheld a
compulsory flag salute for schoolchildren.177 Jehovah’s Witnesses, relying on their
interpretation of the Bible, insisted that saluting a secular symbol violated their
religious beliefs and the express language in Exodus 20: 4-5: “Thou shalt not make
unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or
that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. Thou shalt not bow
down thyself to them, nor serve them.” 178
The case involved the refusal of two children, Lillian Gobitas (12 years old) and
her brother William (10), to salute the U.S. flag because of their religious beliefs as
Jehovah’s Witnesses.179 The family name would be spelled incorrectly as “Gobitis”
throughout the litigation.180 The school regarded their refusal to salute the flag as an
act of insubordination, expelling them from school. Their father lacked the funds
needed to pay for their education at a private school. 181
Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter relied heavily on two principles:
liberty requires unifying sentiments and national unity promotes national security. 182
His decision was excoriated by law journals, the press, and religious
171
172
173
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organizations.183 Of the thirty-nine law reviews that analyzed the decision, thirtyone did so critically, and newspapers accused the Court of violating constitutional
liberties and yielding to popular hysteria.184 Editorials in 171 newspapers ripped
Frankfurter’s opinion.185
Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, part of Frankfurter’s 8-1 majority, began
to regret their votes.186 Two years later, they offered a public apology, stating that
the Court’s decision in the flag-salute case was “wrongly decided.”187 The Court’s
lineup now stood at 5-4. That margin was shaky because two members of the 1940
opinion retired from the Court and were replaced by Wiley Rutledge and Robert H.
Jackson.188 Opinions by Rutledge while serving on the D.C. Circuit suggested that
he would likely join Stone, Black, Douglas and Murphy in overturning Gobitis.189
The flag-salute issue returned to the Supreme Court in 1943, this time involving
a West Virginia case. With a 6-3 majority, the Court overruled its 1940 decision.190
Only Justices Roberts and Reed agreed with Frankfurter that Gobitis was properly
decided.191 Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson wrote a powerful and moving
defense for religious liberty. However, credit for the reversal belongs to those who
refused to accept the Court’s 1940 decision and the constitutional reasoning that
accompanied it. Citizens and organizations around the country told the Court it did
not understand the Constitution, minority rights, or religious freedom. 192
Consider other judicial reversals. In 1916, Congress passed legislation to
regulate child labor in interstate commerce.193 Two years later, a 5-4 Supreme Court
struck down the statute as unconstitutional. 194 Congress did not accept judicial
finality. Lawmakers passed legislation to regulate child labor through the taxing
power. In 1922, the Court assembled an 8-1 majority to strike down that legislative
effort.195 Congress responded by passing a constitutional amendment in 1924 to
support its authority to regulate child labor but by 1937 only twenty-eight of the
necessary thirty-six states had ratified it.196
Congress remained intent on passing child-labor legislation. In 1938 it passed
183 “Frankfurter v. Stone,” The New Republic, vol. 102, pp. 843-44 (June 24, 1940); Walton Hamilton
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a bill that relied once again on the commerce power.197 In 1941, a unanimous
Supreme Court upheld the statute. 198 As to its decision in 1918, the Court now
remarked that it “was novel when made and unsupported by any provision of the
Constitution . . . .”199 Not a shred of constitutional support! The Court in 1941
repudiated both the doctrine of judicial finality and the assertion of judicial
infallibility. The Court held that judgments on which goods to exclude from
interstate commerce considered injurious to the public health, morals, or welfare
were reserved to the elected branches, not to the judiciary. 200 The motive and
purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce “are matters for the legislative
judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over
which the courts are given no control.”201
VIII. THE SOLE-ORGAN DOCTRINE
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright (1936), Justice George Sutherland departed
from the core issue before the Supreme Court: could Congress delegate to the
President certain powers in the field of international relations?202 Legislation
enacted in 1934 authorized the President to prohibit the sale of arms in the Chaco
region in South America whenever he found that “it may contribute to the
reestablishment of peace” between belligerents. 203 When President Roosevelt
imposed the embargo he relied exclusively on statutory authority. The proclamation
prohibiting the sale of arms and munitions began: “NOW, THEREFORE, I,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States, acting and by virtue
of the authority conferred in me by the said joint resolution of Congress.”204
In upholding the delegation, the Court proceeded to add dicta about the President
possessing “plenary and exclusive” power for foreign affairs and serving as the “sole
organ” in external affairs.205 Anyone reading the text of the Constitution would
understand that the Framers did not place all power of external affairs in the
President. For the phrase “sole organ,” the Court relied on a speech given by John
Marshall in 1800 when he served in Congress.206 The year marked an election
contest between President John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. In the House,
Jefferson’s supporters urged that Adams be either impeached or censured for turning
over to England an individual charged with murder.207 Because the case was already
pending in an American court, some lawmakers wanted to sanction Adams for
197
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encroaching on the judiciary and violating the principle of separation of powers. 208
Lawmakers and executive officials disagreed about the nationality of the person
released to the British. The House resolution began: “it appears to this House that a
person, calling himself Jonathan Robbins, and claiming to be a citizen of the United
States,” was held on a British ship and committed to trial in the United States “for
the alleged crime of privacy and murder, committed on the high seas, on board the
British frigate Hermione.”209 This claim relied on “it appears,” “calling himself,”
and “claiming to be.” What were the facts? Robbins said he was from Danbury,
Connecticut, but citizens living there certified they had never known an inhabitant
of the town “by the name of Jonathan or Nathan Robbins, and that there has not been
nor now is any family known by the name of Robbins within the limits of said
town.”210 To Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, Robbins was using an assumed
name and was actually Thomas Nash, a native Irishman. 211 U.S. District Judge
Thomas Bee, asked to turn the prisoner over to the British, agreed that the individual
was Thomas Nash.212
Marshall, in a lengthy floor address, explained why there was no basis for
impeachment or censure. The Jay Treaty with England contained an extradition
provision in Article 27, providing that each country deliver up to each other “all
persons” charged with murder or forgery.213 Therefore, President Adams was not
making foreign policy unilaterally. Instead, he was implementing a treaty. He
fulfilled his Article II, Section 3, authority to take care that the laws, including
treaties, be faithfully executed. Under Article VI of the Constitution, all treaties
“shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”
During his speech defending Adams, Marshall added this sentence: “The
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations.”214 The phrase “sole organ” is ambiguous.
“Sole” means exclusive but what is “organ?” Simply the President’s duty to
communicate to other nations U.S. policy decided jointly by the elected branches?
Anyone reading the entire speech would understand that Marshall was not investing
the President with plenary and exclusive authority over external affairs. He merely
defended Adams for carrying out the extradition provision in the Jay Treaty. By the
time Marshall completed his presentation, Jeffersonians considered his argument so
tightly reasoned that they dropped plans to impeach or censure Adams. 215
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Beginning in 1938 and carrying forward, decade-by-decade, scholars
thoroughly discredited Justice Sutherland’s opinion for his erroneous use of
Marshall’s sole-organ speech.216 Throughout that period, executive agencies and
federal courts relied extensively on the sole-organ doctrine to promote independent
presidential power in external affairs. 217 In 1941, Attorney General Robert Jackson
described Curtiss-Wright as “a Christmas present to the President.” 218 Executive
branch attorneys have turned to the decision with great frequency. As noted by
Harold Koh, Justice Sutherland’s “lavish description of the president’s powers is so
often quoted that it has come to be known as the ‘Curtiss-Wright, so I’m right cite’—
a statement of deference to the president so sweeping as to be worthy of frequent
citation in any government foreign-affairs brief.”219
In another error in Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland claimed that the
Constitution commits treaty negotiation exclusively to the President. That is
incorrect, as the record plainly shows. Presidents frequently invite not only Senators
but also members of the House of Representatives to participate in treaty negotiation.
They do that to build political support in the Senate for treaties and support in the
House for authorization and appropriation bills needed to implement treaties. 220
Ironically, a book published by Sutherland in 1919 acknowledged that Senators do
in fact participate in treaty negotiation and Presidents often accede to this “practical
construction.”221 How could Sutherland, drawing on his twelve years in the U.S.
Senate and personal knowledge about Senators being involved in treaty negotiation,
place such an obvious error in the Curtiss-Wright decision?
The apparent rule in the Justice Department: if something appears in a Supreme
Court decision that promotes presidential power, no matter how egregiously in error,
then cite it as fully adequate authority. On a regular basis the Justice Department
exploits judicial misconceptions to advance presidential power. In 2009, the Office
of Legal Counsel cited “clear dicta” in Curtiss-Wright that “[i]nto the field of
negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade
it.”222 Clear dicta? No doubt about that. But also erroneous dicta.
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IX. FIXING THE SOLE-ORGAN ERROR
Litigation starting in the George W. Bush administration led the Supreme Court
to review some Curtiss-Wright dicta. Congress passed legislation in 2002 stating
that for purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance
of a passport of a U.S. citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary of State
“shall, upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the place
of birth as Israel.” 223 In signing the bill, President Bush objected that several
provisions “impermissibly interfere with the constitutional functions of the
presidency in foreign affairs, including provisions that purport to establish foreign
policy that are of significant concern.” He expressed particular constitutional
concern about Section 214.224 By referring to the President’s constitutional authority
to “speak for the Nation in international affairs” he implicitly, if not explicitly, relied
on Curtiss-Wright dicta.
As a first principle, we treat as law what appears in a statute, not what is said in
a signing statement.225 Moreover, the remarks by Bush highlight a number of
widespread misconceptions. He said that Section 214 would “impermissibly
interfere with the President’s constitutional authority to formulate the position of the
United States.” The process of creating public policy in external affairs is a
constitutional duty assigned to both elected branches, as the Justice Department
acknowledged in its brief to the Supreme Court in February 2014. It correctly stated
that Congress “also possesses the power to regulate passports pursuant to its
enumerated powers.”226 The Justice Department agreed that the Constitution
“provides that the two Branches exercise some foreign-affairs powers jointly.”227 To
that extent, the administration rejected an interpretation of the sole-organ doctrine
that placed all of external affairs with the President.
In his signing statement, President Bush asserted that Section 214 interfered
with the President’s authority to “determine the terms on which recognition is given
to foreign states,” suggesting that the recognition power is vested solely in the
President under Article II of the Constitution. There is no evidence that the Framers
placed the recognition power solely in the President and it is “certainly not a power
that is plenary in nature.”228 Executive recognition decisions “are not exclusive but
are subject to laws enacted by Congress.” 229
Following the Bush signing statement in 2002, a federal district court two years
later granted the administration’s motion to dismiss a challenge by private parties,
223
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finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the issue was a nonjusticiable
political question.230 In 2006, the D.C. Circuit held that one of the plaintiffs, a threeyear old child, suffered injury and remanded the case to the district court. The
constitutional question posed several issues, including which should prevail: a statute
passed by Congress pursuant to its legislative authority over passport policy, or the
administration’s policy included in the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual?
Which would have greater weight: a statute or an agency manual? On remand, the
district court once again held that the case presented a nonjusticiable political
question.231 The D.C. Circuit affirmed.232 On a request to rehear the case en banc,
the D.C. Circuit denied the petition.233
On March 26, 2012, the Supreme Court vacated the D.C. Circuit’s ruling and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Divided 8-1, the Court specifically
rejected the position of the D.C. Circuit that the political question doctrine prohibited
judicial review of Zivotofsky’s claim. It concluded that federal courts “are fully
capable of determining whether this statute may be given effect, or instead must be
struck down in light of authority conferred on the Executive by the Constitution.”234
The D.C. Circuit issued a decision on July 23, 2013, concluding that the
President “exclusively holds” the constitutional power to determine whether to
recognize a foreign government and that Section 214(d) of the 2002 statute
“impermissibly intrudes on the President’s recognition power and is therefore
unconstitutional.”235 Halfway into its analysis of legal and historical precedents it
turned to Supreme Court decisions, relying heavily on the sole-organ doctrine in
Curtiss-Wright. It said the Court “echoed” the words of then-Congressman John
Marshall by describing the President as the “sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.” 236 The Court echoed
Marshall’s words but not his meaning. The D.C. Circuit demonstrated no
understanding that the sole-organ doctrine was not merely dicta but erroneous dicta.
On four other occasions, the D.C. Circuit cited Curtiss-Wright’s sole-organ
theory.237 As a lower court, it said that “carefully considered” language of the
Supreme Court, “even if technically dictum, generally must be treated as
authoritative.”238 First, the language in Curtiss-Wright regarding the sole-organ
doctrine is not carefully considered. It wholly distorts what Marshall said. Second,
quite a bit of discretion exists with the word “generally.” For further guidance, the
D.C. Circuit depended on Supreme Court dicta as especially authoritative if
“reiterated.”239 The D.C. Circuit seemed unaware that dicta could be repeated many
times and still be false, as with the sole-organ doctrine.
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The D.C. Circuit’s reliance on the erroneous sole-organ doctrine prompted this
author to file an amicus brief with the Supreme Court on July 17, 2014. The
summary to the brief explained that the purpose of John Marshall’s speech in 1800
was to defend President Adams for carrying out a treaty provision and that nothing
in the speech promoted independent presidential authority in external affairs. 240 The
brief noted that scholars regularly identified defects in the dicta that Justice
Sutherland added to Curtiss-Wright, “but the Supreme Court has yet to correct his
errors. It is time to do so.”241
The brief identifies three erroneous dicta in Curtiss-Wright: the sole-organ
doctrine, the belief that Presidents are the sole negotiator of treaties, and the claim
that sovereign powers came directly to the national government and bypassed the
states.242 As for the third error, the Court said that states “severally never possessed
international powers.”243 That is false. The Court claimed that after the Declaration
of Independence “the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to
the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity
as the United States of America.”244
External sovereignty did not circumvent the colonies and the independent states,
passing directly to the national government. When Great Britain entered into a peace
treaty with America it was not with a national government because one did not yet
exist. The agreement of November 30, 1782 states: “His Britannic Majesty
acknowledges the said United States, vis. New-Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay,
Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and
Georgia,” referring to them as “free, sovereign and independent States.” 245 During
that time, “states operated as sovereign entities” and entered into treaties.246
On June 8, 2015, the Supreme Court rejected the sole-organ doctrine that had
magnified presidential power in external affairs for seventy-nine years. Writing for
the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy reviewed the position of Secretary of State John
Kerry, who urged the Court to define executive power over foreign affairs in broad
terms, relying on language in Curtiss-Wright that described the President as “the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.” 247 In
response, the Court said it “declines to acknowledge the unbounded power,” stating
that Curtiss-Wright “does not extend so far as the Secretary suggests.” 248
There are several deficiencies with the Court’s opinion. First, it never clarified
240

Brief Amicus Curiae of Louis Fisher in Support of Petitioner at 2, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct.
2076 (2015) (No. 13-628); available at http://www.loufisher.org/docs/pip/Zivotofsky.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HD2Y-UTVQ].
241 Id. at 2-3.
242 See id. at 8-23.
243 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936).
244 Id.
245 8 Stat. 55 (1782).
246 Brief Amicus Curiae of Louis Fisher in Support of Petitioner at 19, Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (No.
13-628).
247 Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2089 (2015).
248 Id.

32

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

how the statutory issue in question had anything to do with the President’s
recognition power. Second, it did not acknowledge that when the D.C. Circuit
upheld the administration’s policy it relied five times on the erroneous sole-organ
dicta in Curtiss-Wright. Readers would not understand the legal significance of the
sole-organ doctrine in this case. Third, the Court did not explain how Justice
Sutherland misrepresented John Marshall’s speech.
Why omit such basic and relevant information? Was it considered inappropriate
to point an accusing finger at a particular Justice in 1936 and underscore the failure
of his colleagues to double-check Marshall’s speech to make sure it was being
properly cited? Would such an explanation discredit the Supreme Court as an
institution capable of constitutional analysis? A straightforward analysis of
Sutherland’s error in 2015 would have served the important purpose of alerting the
D.C. Circuit and other courts to take special care when citing dicta, particularly after
the sole-organ dicta had been repudiated by scholars for more than seven decades.
The Court left in place Sutherland’s erroneous dicta about the President
possessing sole power to negotiate treaties. It even offered fresh support for that
misconception, stating that the President “has the sole power to negotiate treaties.”249
In that same paragraph, the Court stated that the Constitution “thus assigns the
President means to effect recognition on his own initiative. Congress, by contrast,
has no constitutional power that would enable it to initiate diplomatic relations with
a foreign nation.” In fact, members of Congress travel abroad on a regular basis to
meet with foreign leaders and see those leaders when they visit Washington, D.C.
Not only may the Justice Department, reporters, and others continue to cite this
erroneous dicta from Curtiss-Wright, but they can refer to the Court’s fresh
endorsement that the error remains a valid and binding source of constitutional
authority. How many other professions, including medicine and engineering, would
make an error seventy-nine years ago, allow it to effect policy over that time with
regrettable results, and then give it fresh support no matter how often studies had
highlighted the error?
The Court did not discuss scholarly studies that from 1938 to the present time
regularly attacked Curtiss-Wright for its errors about presidential power. 250 The
Court did cite an article by Michael Glennon but it failed to mention what he said
about Curtiss-Wright, calling the decision an “extravagant scheme concocted by
Justice George Sutherland.”251 He explained that Sutherland introduced the “sole
organ” quote from Marshall “with no reference to its limiting context,” leading
Sutherland to claim for the President “plenary and exclusive power” over
international relations, a step Glennon called a “breathtaking exegesis” and the
“sheerest of dicta.”252 He proceeded to describe Sutherland’s opinion as “a muddled
law review article wedged with considerable difficulty between the pages of United
249
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States Reports.”253
Having rejected the sole-organ doctrine, the Court proceeded to create a
substitute that promotes independent presidential power in external affairs. It began
by stating that the recognition of foreign nations is a topic on which the federal
government must “speak . . . with one voice” and that voice “must be the
President’s.”254 According to the Court, between the two elected branches “only the
Executive has the characteristic of unity at all times.” 255 Far from revealing unity at
all times, various administrations regularly display inconsistency, conflict, disorder,
and confusion. That is evident not only by studying particular Presidents but by
reading memoirs of top officials who upon retirement chronicle the infighting and
disagreements within an administration.
To the quality of unity the Court then added four more characteristics for the
President: decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch. It borrowed those four qualities
from Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 70.256 Why would the Court assume that
unity plus those four qualities are inherently positive in nature, meriting support for
broad presidential power in external affairs? Unity, decision, activity, secrecy, and
dispatch can certainly have negative consequences. One need only recall presidential
initiatives from 1950 to the present time: Truman allowing U.S. troops in Korea to
travel northward, provoking the Chinese to introduce their military forces in large
numbers and resulting in heavy casualties for both sides; Johnson’s decision to
escalate the war in Vietnam; Reagan’s involvement in Iran-Contra, leading to
prosecution of those involved and nearly to his impeachment; Bush in 2003 using
military force against Iraq on the basis of six claims that Saddam Hussein possessed
weapons of mass destruction—six claims found to be entirely empty; and Obama
ordering military force against Libya in 2011, leaving behind a country broken
legally, economically, and politically, providing a breeding-ground for terrorism.257
In an article published in 2015, Jack Goldsmith evaluated the Court’s decision
in Zivotofsky. He noted that until the Court released its opinion on Section 214(d)
executive branch lawyers “had to rely on shards of judicial dicta, in addition to
executive branch precedents and practices, in assessing the validity of foreign
relations statutes thought to intrude on executive power.” But now these lawyers
“have a Supreme Court precedent with broad arguments for presidential exclusivity
in a case that holds that the President can ignore a foreign relations statute.”258 It is
wrong, he said, to conclude that Zivotofsky repudiates Curtiss-Wright dicta. Instead,
the Court “affirm[ed] Curtiss-Wright’s functional approach to exclusive presidential
power.”259 Those who favor independent presidential power in external affairs will
seek to exploit the Court’s “untidy reasoning.” 260
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In a separate analysis, Esam Ibrahim expressed concern about the “danger” of
providing “a blueprint for the executive branch to establish an exclusive power” and
gives “a determined executive branch the justification it needs to push more deeply
into territory traditionally considered legislative.” 261 As with others, he points out
that Section 214(d) “does not expressly involve recognition.” 262 In his judgment,
Zivotofsky “may be even stronger precedent than Curtiss-Wright ever was” and is
“probably going to replace Curtiss-Wright as support for broad inherent executive
power in [Office of Legal Counsel] opinions.”263
X. JAPANESE-AMERICAN CASES
In Korematsu v. United States (1944), the Supreme Court upheld the relocation
of Japanese Americans (two-thirds of them U.S. citizens) to detention camps. 264
With no evidence of disloyalty or subversive activity and without benefit of any
procedural safeguards, the United States imprisoned Japanese Americans solely on
account of race.265 The previous year, in Hirabayashi v. United States, the Court
upheld a curfew placed on Japanese Americans on the west coast. 266
On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order
9066, leading to a military curfew covering all persons of Japanese descent within a
designated military area, requiring them to “be within their place of residence
between the hours of 8 P.M. and 6 A.M.”267 A month later, Congress passed
legislation to ratify the executive order.268 Gordon Hirabayashi, a U.S. citizen of
Japanese descent, was prosecuted in federal district court for violating the curfew
order.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court upheld the government’s actions.
Hirabayashi, born in Seattle, had never been to Japan nor did he have any association
with Japanese living there.269 He said it “had at all times been his belief that he
would be waiving his rights as an American citizen” if he complied with the curfew
order.270 A jury found him guilty on two counts: not remaining in his place of
residence during the curfew period, and failing to report to the Civil Control Station
to register for evacuation from the military areas. He was sentenced to imprisonment
for a term of three months on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. 271
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Stone concluded “it was within the
constitutional power of Congress and the executive arm of the Government to
prescribe this curfew order for the period under consideration and that its
261
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promulgation by the military commander involved no unlawful delegation of
legislative power.”272 Because of conditions present in the case, Stone said it “is not
for any court to sit in review of the wisdom” of what President Roosevelt and
Congress decided and “substitute its judgment for theirs.” 273 That sounds like a
political question not suitable for judicial consideration. He claimed that the decision
by General John L. DeWitt, who established the curfew, “involved the exercise of
his informed judgment.”274 DeWitt’s action was not informed. He believed that all
Japanese Americans, by race alone, are disloyal. 275 Deferring to certain military
judgments might be justified; deferring to racism is not.
In one of three concurrences, Justice Douglas offered this opinion: “If the
military were right in their belief that among citizens of Japanese ancestry there was
an actual or incipient fifth column, we were indeed faced with the imminent threat
of a dire emergency.”276 If? Belief? Courts are expected to operate on the basis of
independent judgment and reliable evidence, not suppositions and claims. His
decision to forgo judicial independence was clear: “The point is that we cannot sit in
judgment on the military requirements of that hour.” 277
In another concurrence, Justice Murphy could not locate an earlier ruling where
the Court had “sustained a substantial restriction of the personal liberty of citizens of
the United States based upon the accident of race or ancestry.”278 To him, the curfew
order bore “a melancholy resemblance to the treatment accorded to members of the
Jewish race in Germany and in other parts of Europe.”279 His concurrence reads
more like a dissent. In fact, he wrote a dissent initially, but under pressure from
colleagues, decided to convert his opinion into a concurrence.280
A third concurrence by Justice Rutledge denied that courts have no power or
authority to review an action by a military officer. While agreeing that a military
officer “must have wide discretion and room for its operation,” it did not follow for
him that “there may not be bounds beyond which he cannot go.”281 Justice Jackson
wrote a draft concurrence but withheld it. Some views in that draft would later appear
in his dissent in Korematsu.282
President Roosevelt’s executive order led to the transfer of Americans of
Japanese descent to what were euphemistically called “relocation centers.” They
were imprisoned solely on account of their race. Divided 6-3, the Court in
Korematsu supported detention camps in various parts of the country. Writing for
the majority, Justice Black offered this analysis: “In the light of the principles we
272
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announced in the Hirabayashi case, we are unable to conclude that it was beyond the
war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from
the West Coast war area at the time they did.”283 What principles were announced
in Hirabayashi? Basically: Supreme Court Justices should defer to whatever the
elected branches wanted to do. The Court followed political judgments, not
constitutional principles. In one of the dissents, Justice Murphy protested that the
exclusion order resulted from an “erroneous assumption of racial guilt” found in
General DeWitt’s report, which referred to all individuals of Japanese descent as
“subversives” belonging to “an enemy race” whose “racial strains are undiluted.” 284
Murphy chose to dissent from this “legalization of racism.” 285 In his dissent, Justice
Jackson remarked that “here is an attempt to make an otherwise innocent act a crime
merely because this prisoner is the son of parents to which he had no choice, and
belongs to a race from which there is no way to resign.” 286
Although Jackson chose to dissent, he offered reasoning that supported the
majority position. He claimed that the Court, “having no real evidence before it, has
no choice but to accept General DeWitt’s own unsworn, self-serving statement,
untested by any cross-examination, that what he did was reasonable. And thus it will
always be when courts try to look into the reasonableness of a military order.” 287
With that reasoning, Jackson could have joined the majority. No real evidence? No
choice? Thus it will always be? As a member of an independent branch, Jackson
had a duty to probe the basis for the exclusion order and insist on credible and
persuasive evidence.
In Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Supreme Court decided not to challenge and
analyze various executive claims and assertions, many of which were later found to
be erroneous. In 1945, Eugene Rostow issued a critique of the Japanese-American
cases. The wartime treatment of Japanese aliens and citizens of Japanese descent on
the West Coast “has been hasty, unnecessary, and mistaken. The course of action
which we undertook was in no way required or justified by the circumstances of the
war. It was calculated to produce both individual injustice and deep-seated social
maladjustments of a cumulative and sinister kind.”288 The administration was not
required to produce evidence nor was it subjected to cross-examination.289 At the
time of the exclusion orders, Japanese Americans “had lived in California without
DeWitt’s
committing sabotage for five months after Pearl Harbor.”290
recommendation to the Secretary of War on February 14, 1942, referred to the
Japanese as “an enemy race” whose “racial strains are undiluted.” 291
In an article published in 1962, Chief Justice Warren reflected on the JapaneseAmerican cases. To him, the decisions “demonstrate dramatically that there are
283
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some circumstances in which the Court will, in effect, conclude that it is simply not
in a position to reject descriptions by the Executive of the degree of military
necessity.”292 He added this thought: “To put it another way, the fact that the Court
rules in a case like Hirabayashi that a given program is constitutional, does not
necessarily answer the question whether, in a broader sense, it actually is.” 293
On February 20, 1976, President Gerald Ford issued a proclamation apologizing
for the treatment of Japanese Americans during World War II, resulting in “the
uprooting of loyal Americans.”294 In 1980, Congress established a commission to
gather facts and determine the wrong done by Roosevelt’s order. 295 Released in
December 1982, the report stated that the order “was not justified by military
necessity.” The principal factors shaping those decisions were “race prejudice, war
hysteria, and a failure of political leadership.”296 To the commission, the decision in
Korematsu “lies overruled in the court of history.” 297 In 1988, Congress passed
legislation to implement the recommendations of the commission. The statute
acknowledges “the fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relocation, and
internment” of Japanese Americans, apologized for this treatment, and made
restitution to individuals of Japanese ancestry. 298
In the 1980s, Hirabayashi and Korematsu returned to court after newly
discovered documents revealed the extent to which executive officials had deceived
federal courts and the general public. At the time of Korematsu’s case in 1944,
Justice Department attorneys were aware that a 618-page document called “Final
Report,” prepared by the War Department for General DeWitt, contained erroneous
claims about alleged espionage efforts by Japanese Americans. The FBI and the
Federal Communications Commission rejected War Department assertions that some
Japanese Americans had sent signals from shore to assist Japanese submarine attacks
along the Pacific coast.299 With abundant evidence of executive branch efforts to
deceive the judiciary, Hirabayashi and Korematsu filed a writ of coram nobis,
charging the government with committing fraud against the court. Through those
actions their convictions were reversed.300
On May 20, 2011, Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal publicly acknowledged
that Solicitor General Charles Fahy had failed to inform the Supreme Court of
evidence that undermined the rationale for internment. Katyal underscored the duty
of the Solicitor General to be candid and truthful in making representations to the
Court: “Only then can we fulfill our responsibility to defend the United States and
292
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its Constitution, and to protect the rights of all Americans.” 301
Consider these responses to the Japanese-American cases: President Ford’s
apology in 1976, the commission’s report in 1982, the successful coram nobis
actions by Hirabayasi and Korematsu in the mid-1980s, congressional legislation in
1988, and Katyal’s announcement in 2011. The Supreme Court had abundant
evidence that its decisions in the Japanese-American cases were in error and needed
to be corrected. Yet nothing happened until June 26, 2018, when the Court in Trump
v. Hawaii acknowledged that Korematsu was defective as a constitutional ruling.
In upholding a travel ban issued by President Trump in September 2017, Chief
Justice Roberts noted that the dissent by Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, repudiated Korematsu. To Roberts, whatever “rhetorical advantage the
dissent may see in doing so, Korematsu has nothing to do with this case.”302 He said
that the “forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and
explicitly on the basis of race” had no application to the travel ban. 303 Yet he then
added: “The dissent’s reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the
opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong
the day it was decided, has been overruled by the court of history, and—to be clear—
‘has no place in law under the Constitution.’”304
The Court’s action raises several questions. If Korematsu was wrong the day it
was decided, why did it take the Court seventy-four years to admit it? Why was the
decision overruled by a non-judicial body: “the court of history”? Given the Court’s
acknowledgment in 2018 that Korematsu was defective, what about Hirabayashi?
Is it still good law? Couldn’t the Court on the same day repudiate both? After the
announcement in Trump v. Hawaii, Charlie Savage for the New York Times referred
to Korematsu as a “notorious precedent” that remained law “because no case gave
justices a good opportunity to overrule it.”305 Does the Court have to wait for a case
to correct one of its rulings? Nothing prevents the Court from announcing that an
earlier opinion was so utterly defective that it should no longer be cited as having
constitutional value.
XI. STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
Curtiss-Wright and the Japanese-American cases highlight the capacity of the
Supreme Court to make errors and leave them uncorrected for more than seven
decades. Curtiss-Wright was discredited by the Court’s failure to understand John
Marshall’s sole-organ speech. Hirabayashi and Korematsu were undermined in
large part because the executive branch had committed fraud on the courts. Those
301
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same issues apply to United States v. Reynolds, involving a midair explosion of a B29 bomber.306 Six of nine crewmembers perished, along with three of the four
civilian engineers on board.307
Three widows of the engineers filed a tort claims action to determine if the Air
Force had been negligent.308 As with the sole-organ doctrine and the JapaneseAmerican cases, the Supreme Court in Reynolds relied on false information about
presidential power. For example, in its brief submitted to the Court in 1952, the
Justice Department cited the Aaron Burr trial of 1807 as a precedent for the executive
branch to withhold sensitive documents from the courts. 309 The department
produced a list of what it called successful assertions of the state secrets privilege.
Among the examples: “[c]onfidential information and letters relating to Burr’s
conspiracy.”310 Guided by the Justice Department, courts have cited the Burr trial
as a legitimate precedent for the state secrets privilege. A district court in 1977
claimed that the privilege “can be traced as far back as Aaron Burr’s trial in 1807.” 311
In 1989, the D.C. Circuit located the “initial roots” of the privilege to Burr’s trial.312
A district court in 2004 explained that the origin of the privilege “can be traced back
to the treason trial of Aaron Burr.”313
Those claims are false. As will be explained, Burr insisted on certain documents
to defend himself and was fully supported by the judiciary. Burr’s trial in Richmond,
Virginia, was handled by Chief Justice Marshall, who understood that he needed to
issue a subpoena to President Jefferson for certain documents. If it be a duty to issue
a subpoena to the President, “the court can have no choice in the case.” 314 Marshall’s
primary concern was that the judiciary would lose respect by failing to give an
accused access to information needed for his defense. He said that if he were a party
to withholding documents needed by a defendant to clear his name, he would
“deplore” any action on his part to deny Burr documents needed to clear his name. 315
Jefferson assured the court of his “readiness” to furnish on “all occasions whatever
the purposes of justice may require,” expressing “a perfect willingness to do what is
right.”316 The jury found Burr not guilty of treason and a misdemeanor charge. 317
Despite claims by the Justice Department and several federal courts, the Burr trial is
not a precedent for the state secrets privilege.
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In Reynolds, the Court considered the state secrets doctrine as a privilege “well
established in the law of evidence.”318 Among the cases the Court cited for that
proposition, and standing first in line, is a Civil War government spy case, Totten v.
United States.319 The case involved a contract between President Lincoln and
William A. Lloyd, in which Lloyd agreed to collect data on Confederate troops.
Lloyd was to be paid $200 a month but received funds only to cover his expenses.
After he died, his family sought to recover compensation for his services. The
Supreme Court concluded that the case was not justiciable because it involved a
confidential agreement between a President and someone he hired as a spy. 320
However, a state secrets case is justiciable. The widows in the B-29 case had every
right to file their case. Nothing in Totten had any bearing on the Reynolds case even
if the Supreme Court mistakenly thought otherwise.
Litigation in Reynolds began when the three widows brought action under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. They asked for the accident report and depositions of the
three surviving crewmembers. Under the tort claims statute, federal agencies settle
claims against the United States caused by negligent or wrongful acts by federal
employees acting within the scope of their official duties. 321 Congress empowered
courts to exercise individual judgment. There were no grounds for judges to accept
at face value a government’s claim that an agency document sought by plaintiffs was
somehow privileged. Courts must examine documents to verify assertions by the
government. Permitting executive officials to withhold documents that reveal
government negligence would make a nullity of the statute.
The lawsuit was assigned to Judge William H. Kirkpatrick in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania. Guided by various precedents, he decided on June 30, 1950, that
the accident report and findings of the Air Force’s investigation were “not
privileged.”322 Rather than share all documents with the plaintiffs, he directed the
government to produce for his examination certain documents, including the
accident report. He would read the material in his chamber (in camera review).
When the government failed to produce the documents he requested, he ruled in
favor of the three widows.323
The case moved to the Third Circuit, where the government insisted that
“disclosure by the head of an executive department cannot be coerced.”324 The
appellate court insisted on judicial independence and the right of plaintiffs to pursue
their claim. It upheld Judge Kirkpatrick’s decision that good cause had been shown
to produce the accident report and statement of survivors for his reading in camera.
Considerations of justice required access to facts. 325 To grant the government the
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“sweeping privilege” it claimed would be contrary to “a sound public policy.” 326 It
would be “a small step to assert a privilege against any disclosure of records merely
because they might prove embarrassing to government officers.”327
The government then took the case to the Supreme Court, insisting that “there
are well settled privileges for state secrets and for communications of informers, both
of which are applicable here.”328 On March 9, 1953, Chief Justice Vinson ruled that
the government had presented a valid claim of privilege. 329 The Court divided 6-3,
with Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissenting “substantially for the
reasons set forth in the opinion of Judge Maris” for the Third Circuit.330 Those words
consisted of their entire dissent. They did not indicate what parts of Maris’s decision
they accepted or rejected. The three dissenters flatly refused to say a single word
about potential weaknesses and deficiencies in the majority opinion.
As to the duty of the Supreme Court to exercise judicial supervision over
executive actions, Vinson offered this view: “The court itself must determine
whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so
without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.”331
His point was misleading. If the government can keep a document from a judge,
even for in camera review, a judge could not possibly “determine whether the
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege.” To Vinson: “Judicial
control over the evidence of a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive
officers.”332 Yet if an executive officer did act capriciously and arbitrarily, a judge
following Vinson’s procedure would not be aware of those actions. Without access
to evidence, federal courts necessarily rely on assertions and allusions by the
government. The Supreme Court chose not to look at the accident report in camera,
preferring to trust in statements by the government.
The accident report was declassified in 1995.333 It contains no state secrets but
abundant evidence that the Air Force was negligent in allowing the B-29 to fly. 334
The three families sued the government under a writ of coram nobis, charging that
the government had misled the Supreme Court and committed fraud against it. 335
Tolerating fraud in a particular case lowers respect for judges, reduces confidence in
the courts, and leads to future injuries to individual rights. The government argued
that the issue of coram nobis relief should be sent back to district court, but plaintiffs
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insisted that the Supreme Court “should now act in this case to set things right.” 336
Without explanation, the Court on June 12, 2003 issued a statement reading
“[m]otion for leave to file a petition for writ of error coram nobis denied.”337 The
Court had an opportunity to confront erroneous claims by the government regarding
the contents of the accident report. It failed to do that. It also neglected to
acknowledge that it failed to read the report in camera.
The plaintiffs returned to lower courts in pursuit of justice. They lost in district
court338 and the Third Circuit.339 On May 1, 2006, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.340 At every level of this litigation, the judiciary signaled to the executive
branch that it is at liberty to present false claims and arguments to courts at no cost
to itself. The constitutional value ignored is the need to protect the integrity,
independence, and reputation of the federal judiciary and the right of private citizens
to pursue their interests in courts. When courts operate in that manner, citizens lose
faith in the judiciary, the rule of law, the adversary legal process, and the
constitutional principle of checks and balances.
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration invoked the state
secrets privilege to prevent litigants from challenging the practice of the executive
branch to conduct electronic surveillance and to transfer individuals to other
countries for interrogation and torture. Consider the case of Khaled El-Masri, who
traveled to Macedonia at the end of 2003 for vacation. Border guards detained him
in part because of confusion about his name. 341 They thought he was Khalid alMasri, a suspect from an Al Qaeda cell in Hamburg, Germany. 342 Moreover, there
was concern that his passport was a forgery.343 CIA agents flew him to a prison in
Afghanistan where he was subjected to abuse and violence. 344 Eventually the CIA
determined that his passport was genuine and they had imprisoned the wrong person.
On May 28, 2004, he was flown to Albania and allowed to return to Germany.
El-Masri sued CIA Director George Tenet, the airlines used by the CIA, and
current and former employees of the agency. 345 The Bush administration invoked
the state secrets privilege to prevent the case from moving toward discovery of
government documents.346 A federal district court began its decision by stating that
“courts must not blindly accept the Executive Branch’s assertion” of the state secrets
privilege.347 It then abandoned any pretense of judicial independence by stating it
336
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“must bear in mind the Executive Branch’s preeminent authority over military and
diplomatic matters,” requiring the court to accept executive branch assertions
without attempting “a judicial balancing of the various interests at stake.” 348 It held
that the state secrets privilege had been validly asserted in this case. 349 The Fourth
Circuit affirmed, pointing out that a case of this nature “pits the judiciary’s search
for truth against the Executive’s duty to maintain the nation’s security.” 350
Although relief for El-Masri would not be available from American courts, on
December 13, 2012, the European Court of Human Rights unanimously ruled that
he was an innocent victim of torture and abuse.351 The Court held Macedonia
responsible for his mistreatment and transfer to U.S. authorities and ordered
Macedonia to pay $78,000 in damages to El-Masri.352 Macedonia’s Ministry of
Justice said it would comply.353 This process brought a measure of justice and
accountability, but the United States offered no admission of error.
The Bush administration inflicted great harm on Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen.
Upon returning home to Ottawa in September of 2002, he was pulled aside for
questioning at JFK airport by New York police and FBI agents. Within a short time,
the administration sent him to Syria where for nearly a year he was subjected to
beatings and threatened with other physical abuse. Unable to link him to terrorism,
he was eventually released by Syria. Arar then filed a civil suit seeking money
damages and declaratory relief from a number of U.S. officials. As with El-Masri,
the Bush administration invoked the state secrets privilege. 354 A federal district court
dismissed Arar’s claim for declaratory relief, holding that Arar lacked standing to
bring the claim.355
In a 7-4 opinion, the Second Circuit decided not to offer Arar any declaratory
relief.356 In deferring to the executive branch, the majority relied in part on the
erroneous dicta in the Curtiss-Wright case about the “plenary and exclusive power
of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations.”357 In a dissent, Judge Barringer Daniels Parker pointed to
“an enormous difference between being deferential and being supine in the face of
governmental misconduct.”358 It is not the role of the judiciary “to serve as a helpmate to the executive branch” and avoid “difficult decisions for fear of complicating
life for federal officials.”359 Judge Guido Calibresi, in another dissent, objected to
348
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the majority’s “utter subservience to the executive branch.”360
To its credit, Canada conducted an independent investigation to determine the
facts and produced a three-volume, 822-page report concluding that Canadian
intelligence officials had shared with the United States false warnings and unreliable
information about Arar. Following this study, on January 26, 2007, Prime Minister
Stephen Harper released a public apology.361 Arar and his family received $10.5
million in compensation.362 Canada found fault and took steps to bring justice. The
United States, responsible for Arar’s suffering, offered no apology.
When the Obama administration issued a report to Congress on April 29, 2011,
regarding the state secrets privilege, it concluded that no change was warranted with
respect to assertions of the privilege by the Bush administration, including actions
taken against Khaled El-Masri and Maher Arar.363 Moreover, in a number of other
cases the Obama administration invoked the privilege to abuse individual rights,
including placing them on the no-fly list without making public the reasons for doing
so. Often the government can rely on arbitrary and erroneous reasons to deny
individuals the right to fly.364
The pattern of judicial deference to executive claims of the state secrets privilege
largely continued.365 The unwillingness of federal judges to independently analyze
charges of executive illegality in cases of state secrets is evident in the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.366 Litigation began under
President Bush after 9/11 and carried forward into the Obama administration. The
case involved a private contractor who provided assistance to what were called CIA
torture flights.367 Initially, the Ninth Circuit claimed it had an obligation to “make
an independent determination whether the information is privileged.”368
Yet it soon chose to acquiesce entirely to executive claims, relying on an earlier
case for this guidance: “In evaluating the need for secrecy, ‘we acknowledge the
need to defer to the Executive on matters of foreign policy and national security and
surely cannot legitimately find ourselves second guessing the Executive in this
arena.’”369 A dissent by Judge Hawkins underscored the fundamental defect of this
judicial attitude: “Permitting the executive to police its own errors and determine the
remedy dispensed would not only deprive the judiciary of its role, but also deprive
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Plaintiffs of a fair assessment of their claims by a neutral arbiter.” 370
XII. CONCLUSIONS
From 2015 to 2018, the Supreme Court corrected errors in Curtiss-Wright and
Korematsu. In Reynolds, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to respect the
constitutional principles that guided the district court and the Third Circuit: judicial
independence, checks and balances, the rights of litigants to seek justice, and an
insistence on reading the accident report in camera. The Court ignored all four
principles, choosing to simply defer to executive power and assertions. Five decades
later, when the three families returned to seek justice, the Court was fully aware of
its errors. It was time to correct them. Yet the court let them survive.
As a consequence, the executive branch continues to assert the state secrets
privilege and federal judges routinely defer to presidential authority. The result:
private litigants are regularly denied access to fundamental constitutional
protections. Justice would be served if the Supreme Court announced, without any
litigation, that its decision in Reynolds was defective because it failed to look at the
accident report and wrongly acquiesced to executive claims, with those claims later
found to be false. If the Supreme Court took that initiative, the executive branch and
federal courts could no longer rely on Reynolds for support and guidance. Private
citizens could begin to build trust in a judiciary capable of reaching independent and
informed decisions.
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